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Abstract—Situational awareness is crucial for effective dis-
aster management. However, obtaining information about the
actual situation is usually difficult and time-consuming. While
there has been some effort in terms of incorporating the
affected population as a source of information, the issue of
obtaining trustworthy information has not yet received much
attention. Therefore, we introduce the concept of witness-
based report verification, which enables users from the affected
population to evaluate reports issued by other users. We present
an extensive overview of the objectives to be fulfilled by such a
scheme and provide a first approach considering security and
privacy. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our approach
in a simulation study. Our results highlight synergetic effects
of group mobility patterns that are likely in disaster situations.
Keywords-Security and Privacy Protection, Mobile commu-
nication systems, Multicast
I. INTRODUCTION
Responding to large-scale disasters has always been a
challenging task. One of the reasons for this is the un-
predictability of the actual situation at hand. With first
responders usually being short on technical and human
resources, an awareness of the current circumstances, e.g. the
location of casualties, is substantial to effectively providing
help to victims within the first critical hours. In order
to increase the situational awareness of officials and to
support mutual first response, the concept of incorporating
the affected population as a potential source of information
has emerged recently [1]. Among the potential Mobile Social
Networking (MSN) services for disaster response [2], one
of the most important services is a reporting service that
enables the affected population to issue reports about the
locations of victims, remaining or evolving hazards, resource
requirements, etc. With other services building upon the
data collected by this service, it is essential that this in-
formation is authentic and accurate to allow appropriate
decision making. Therefore, apart from ensuring a high
quality of information, a crucial aspect of this service is
to implement countermeasures against users trying to inject
false or inaccurate information about allegedly urgent events.
In this work, we introduce a rating approach relying on
the affected population to verify the correctness and urgency
of reports. In our approach, which we refer to as Voting for
Urgent Events (VUE), witnesses report certain events to so-
called verifier nodes. These verifier nodes issue confirmation
requests to potential witnesses of the event, asking them
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Figure 1. Witness-based report verification
to decide about the accuracy and urgency of the report.
Witnesses can then vote with their decision, allowing the
verifier node to rate a report (see Fig. 1).
Our witness-based approach is inspired by the issue of
obtaining credible information in social swarming applica-
tions [3]. In social swarming, a swarm of users tries to
cooperatively fulfill certain tasks, e.g., search and rescue.
Users in the swarm may send reports to a swarm director
using their smartphones. Based on his global view, the
swarm director then provides instructions to users to achieve
the common goal. In order to obtain credible information,
the swarm director may selectively query users for confirma-
tion. Accordingly, in our verification schemes, confirmation
requests are issued to certain users. However, in their work,
the authors focus on the problem of optimizing the network
resources by querying the most suitable users based on their
credibility under normal network conditions. In contrast, we
apply the concept of querying specific users to deal with
the challenges of verifying reports in disaster situations.
On one hand, this concerns the need to communicate in
a delay-tolerant manner due to the failure of parts of the
network infrastructure. On the other hand, in order to meet
legal requirements and gain acceptance among users, such
a scheme has to protect the privacy of the witnesses. This
is especially the case if such an approach is deployed on
mobile devices that are also used in normal conditions, e.g.,
to provide help also in a small scale car accident.
Apart from the issue of obtaining credible information
in social swarming, there are several related research areas.
On one hand, there has been work on trustworthy ubiqui-
tous emergency communication [4]. However, it focuses on
first responders and does not consider the verification of
information for MSN services. On the other hand, regarding
the issue of crowdsourcing information in disasters, exist-
ing approaches are usually open-access, with no or only
limited verification [5]. Furthermore, while there has been
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work on the trustworthiness of information obtained from
microblogging services for emergency situations [6], the
aspect of querying witnesses in the disaster area in order
to verify reports has not been considered yet. Finally, our
approach can be considered an application of the concept
of spatiotemporal multicast, where a message is delivered
to users, i.e., witnesses, encountered in the past while
protecting their privacy from the sender of the message [7].
In this article we make the following contributions: We
propose the concept of witness-based report verification in
the context of a reporting service for disasters and derive
extensive security and privacy objectives (section II). Fur-
thermore, we present a first approach for such a scheme
(section III) and provide a detailed discussion of its security
and privacy features (section IV). Finally, we evaluate our
approach by an extensive simulation study (section V).
II. DESIGN OBJECTIVES
In this work, we consider a network model where users are
able to sporadically access the Internet via a cellular network
infrastructure. Furthermore, we assume that devices are able
to communicate directly forming a local wireless network.
A. Functional Objectives
• Proximity restriction: Only users close to an event
should be able vote for reports about this event.
• Deferring of votes: Users should be able to defer a
vote, e.g., if a user has to provide first aid, he should
be able to defer his vote and submit it later.
B. Non-functional Objectives
• Verification delay: Reports should be verified quickly.
• Robustness: After a disaster, parts of the infrastructure
may fail. Hence, the scheme has to operate in a delay-
and disruption-tolerant manner. Furthermore, it should
be robust against occasional false reports and votes.
• Scalability: The objectives should not be severely
degraded by an increasing number of users and reports.
• Efficiency: The service should be efficient in terms of
computation, memory, and communication overhead.
C. Security Objectives
• Secure communication: Reports and votes must be
delivered confidential, authentic, and of integrity.
• Resilient decision making: The service should be
resilient against malicious reports and votes. Conse-
quently, users must only issue one report about an event
and vote once for each report. Thus, attackers must not
be able to perform Sybil attacks.
• Accountability: Official authorities should be able
to obtain the identity of a reporter or witness for the
prosecution of crimes. However, restrictions must apply
for access to this information in order to prevent abuse.
• Availability: The verification service should provide
resistance against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. This
includes spamming of reports and votes.
D. Privacy Objectives
• Anonymity: Attackers must not learn about the iden-
tities of users issuing reports and votes.
• Location privacy: Attackers must not determine the
location of users. Otherwise, by following their move-
ments, attackers might be able to infer their identities.
• Co-location privacy: Attackers must not determine
whether two users have been residing at the same
location at the same time. Otherwise, attackers might
infer a social connection between those users.
• Absence privacy: Attackers must not learn about a
user’s absence from a location during a certain time.
This information can be harmful if a user was not
present at a location although he was supposed to be.
III. VERIFICATION APPROACH
In this article, we present a verification scheme, which we
refer to as Voting for Urgent Events (VUE). Our approach
allows users to report events to one of potentially many
verifiers via their smartphones, i.e., User Equipments (UEs).
In order to verify a report, the verifier issues confirmation
requests to users that have been residing close to the event
at the time the report has been submitted. Delivering these
confirmation requests in a privacy-preserving manner while
supporting delay-tolerant communication and deferring of
votes requires a Spatiotemporal Multicast (STM) scheme
[7]. It is necessary to rely on this concept as employing
a Geographic Multicast (geocast) scheme would require
witnesses to stay close to the place of the event, which
is an unrealistic assumption. Therefore, building upon the
approach in [7], we rely on Rendezvous Points (RPs) to
deliver confirmation requests in a privacy-preserving man-
ner. This RP-based approach requires that users poll RPs in
regular time intervals using a token τ containing a key K that
has been negotiated at some location and time in the past.
To allow for extensive anonymity guarantees these tokens
are negotiated between nearby users in a cryptographically
secure manner. Hence, in certain time intervals, users initiate
the negotiation of a group key K with all users that are
currently in communication range. Users may also forward
the negotiation requests over several hops to increase the
number of users within a group and therefore the number
of potential witnesses for some event in the future. Tokens
are considered valid up to some time after their reception,
e.g., for 5 minutes. When issuing a report to the verifier,
users include their currently valid tokens to allow the verifier
to deposit a confirmation request at specific RPs so that
potential witnesses of an event are able to retrieve it.
Finally, witnesses having obtained a request can issue their
vote to the verifier, which is then able to decide whether
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Figure 2. Overview of VUE approach. The process of issuing a report is
shown in light gray, while issuing a vote is shown in dark gray.
a report is true based on the majority of votes. In order
to prevent Sybil attacks and to allow users to only issue
one report or vote for each event, an Identity Server (IS) is
necessary that is able to authenticate the identity of users.
Therefore, in order to issue reports or votes, users have to
obtain a voting ticket λ from the IS first. This ticket contains
a vote identifier υ that is unique for each user and report.
Here, it is important that the IS does not obtain the report
itself in order to protect the privacy of users. Therefore, he
issues λ for a given h(M), where h(x) is a cryptographic
hash function and M the message of the report.
We now provide a detailed overview of the four phases
of the VUE approach in the following sections (see Fig. 2).
A. Token Negotiation
In the first phase, users initiate a secure protocol for
a group key exchange in order to negotiate a common
key K (e.g. using Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) [8]) in
certain, randomly distributed time intervals within their k-
hop neighborhood. When the protocol is finished, users have
negotiated a token τ = h(K) which is stored as a pair of
(τ,K) and used to poll for confirmation requests later on.
B. Event Reporting
In order to report an event, a user has to interact with
the IS and verifier. Hence, the user establishes a secure
connection with the IS, e.g., using the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol, and sends h(M) to the IS. Then,
the IS authenticates the identity of the user and responds
with a voting ticket λ = (υ, {h(M), υ}IS), containing the
unique vote identifier υ. Here, υ = h(id, h(M),KIS) with
id representing an identifier for the identity of the user,
e.g. his International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI).
Furthermore, {}IS is the public-key signature of IS and KIS
is a secret that is only known to the IS and used to prevent
the guessing of υ for a known identity and report message.
In order to prevent duplicate reports from different users,
the reporting application should provide users with infor-
mation about reports issued in their neighborhood, allowing
them to recognize existing reports. In this case, no additional
report is sent, allowing users to proactively confirm this
report so that if a confirmation request is received later on,
the device can reply to the request without requiring further
interaction from the user.
Then, the user establishes a secure connection with
the verifier and sends his report ρ = (λ,M,α1, . . . , αl),
where M = (r, x, y, t,m) contains the location x, y, time t,
message description m, and random number r, which is
used to prevent guessing of h(M) by the IS. Furthermore,
αi = (τi, EKi(M)) represents the tokens τ and report mes-
sages M which are symmetrically encrypted with the group
key K for all t currently valid tokens. Finally, the verifier
computes h(M) to verify the signature of the IS and checks
whether there is already a vote or report for the given vote
identifier υ. If this is not the case, the report is accepted.
It should be noted here that it is possible to maintain mul-
tiple verifiers in order to provide resistance against attacks
or to filter reports. Therefore, police, fire, and ambulance
department could each maintain their own verifiers.
C. Confirmation Request
In order to be able to decide whether a report is trust-
worthy, the verifier may send a confirmation request to
specific RPs, where potential witnesses are able to retrieve
them. Therefore, for each αi contained in the report, the
verifier computes a RP identifier rpτi = h(τi). Like in [7],
this identifier is used to obtain the name of the RP where
the request should be deposited. By appending the number
rpτi mod N to a known prefix (N is the number of RPs),
the verifier can resolve the IP address of the RP, e.g. by
Domain Name System (DNS). Finally, having established
a secure connection, the verifier sends (τi, EKi(M)) to the
respective RP, which stores EKi(M) for lookup with τi.
D. Witness Feedback
Witnesses poll RPs in regular time intervals to retrieve re-
quests concerning their stored tokens τ . Here, the addresses
of the RPs are derived as described in the previous section.
Once a user receives EK(M) for a token τ , he decrypts it
using the stored group key K and decides about M . Then, he
establishes a secure connection to the IS and obtains a voting
ticket λ as described above. Finally, after having established
a secure connection, he sends his vote V = (λ, δ) to the
verifier, where δ ∈ {true, false, unsure, defer} is his decision
about the report. Here, in order to support postponing of
votes, if a device does not receive an input from the user
within a certain time limit, it auto-replies with a defer. This
allows the verifier to detect that a vote from a legitimate
witness is still missing in order to postpone his decision
making if a large number of votes is still missing. If the
verifier has received several votes providing a clear majority
for the validity of a report, it is considered true.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Security Aspects
Regarding the security objectives, we assume that poten-
tial attackers have one or more of the following goals: to
obtain knowledge of the content of reports, its reporters and
witnesses (see privacy discussion below), or to propagate
misleading information in order to, e.g., impede relief oper-
ations or hide crimes. To achieve these goals, attackers may
observe the communication between entities, send reports,
vote as a witness, or even compromise RPs. However,
attackers cannot compromise verifiers, the IS, or parts of
the cellular network infrastructure. We consider this an
appropriate assumption as it may be easier to control access
to few verifiers or the IS than protecting a large number of
RPs, which may be required for scalability reasons. With
these abilities, we now discuss the given security objectives.
1) Secure communication: Confidentiality, authentica-
tion, and integrity is provided by a protocol like TLS that
is employed between the entities. Hence, by observing the
communication or participating in the service adversaries
cannot violate this objective. It can also not be violated by
compromising RPs, as those only store encrypted messages.
2) Resilient decision making: By employing an IS, at-
tackers are not able to perform a Sybil attack and can only
issue one report or vote per event. Therefore, by participating
in the service, they can only obtain a malicious majority,
if the majority of votes is malicious. While an adversary
may try to issue false reports where he holds a malicious
majority (i.e. by using non-existing tokens to exclude benign
witnesses), this does not provide an advantage as long as
benign users issue reports about the same event. A more
sophisticated attacker may also be able to compromise RPs.
In this case, while he may not manipulate votes directly, he
can suppress confirmation requests to reduce the number of
witnesses. Nevertheless, if a report contains more than one
token, requests are distributed to different RPs so that an
adversary may only suppress a fraction of votes. Finally, an
adversary may try to manipulate decisions by identity theft,
i.e., stealing votes. Here, the only reasonable countermeasure
is to implement a reputation scheme that allows to filter
malicious or compromised UEs. We plan to investigate such
reputation-based filtering techniques in our future work.
3) Accountability: While privacy of users is an important
aspect, it still has to be possible to reveal the identity of a
user for the prosecution of crimes. This can be achieved by
combining the knowledge of a verifier and the IS, i.e., the
vote identifier υ and KIS , to infer the identity of a reporter
or witness. However, due to pre-image resistance of h(x),
this still requires brute-force testing of all user identifiers id
and comparing it to υ = h(id, ...). Hence, uncovering the
identity of users is possible, but requires significant effort.
4) Availability: Verifiers and the IS can implement coun-
termeasures against spamming by rejecting users who send
reports or votes at too high rates. Countermeasures against
DoS attacks may include techniques like, for example, client
puzzles but are beyond the scope of this paper.
B. Privacy Aspects
In terms of the privacy objectives, we assume that po-
tential attackers have one or more of the following goals:
to infer the identity of users, their locations, co-location of
users, or absence of users from a location. We assume that
attackers have the same abilities as described above. Given
these abilities, we discuss potential attacks against privacy.
1) Observation Attack: If an attacker observes the com-
munication between entities, he is not able to violate the
anonymity of users as he can only see an encrypted traf-
fic flow. Information about the identities belonging to the
involved addresses requires additional knowledge from the
cellular operator. An adversary is also not able to violate
the location, co-location, or absence privacy of users. While
he may observe which UEs poll which RPs, this does not
provide an advantage since RPs are responsible for many
locations at different times in an unpredictable manner due
to the pre-image resistance of h(x) and rpτ = h(τ) [7].
Furthermore, observing the communication with a verifier
or the IS does also not violate any objective as the attacker
cannot read M due to the encrypted communication.
2) Participation Attack: When having access to valid UEs
adversaries may send reports and votes. This corresponds to
the knowledge of an attacker about specific τ , K, and M .
Anonymity: As described above, user identities can
only be violated if location, co-location, or absence privacy
are violated as traffic is relayed only encrypted.
Location privacy: Observing users polling RPs does
not violate the location privacy as RPs are responsible for
many locations at different times. Knowing τ and thus which
RP is used to deliver a confirmation request does therefore
not violate this objective. However, if there is only one
report and the attacker knows the location contained in
M , he may violate the location privacy as he is able to
detect users voting for this report. Still, such a temporal
correlation may not be easy to detect with many reports
and users reacting at different times. Furthermore, attackers
can only obtain information about one location at a specific
time, which is unlikely to be sufficient for inferring their
identities. Nevertheless, if reports are only issued rarely,
users should still contact the IS and verifiers regularly to
obfuscate temporal correlations.
Co-location privacy: According to the location privacy,
this objective may only be violated if there is just one report.
Absence privacy: An attacker may not violate this
objective, as he may only detect absence from a location
if a user does not poll a certain RP. This is unlikely, as
rpτ = h(τ) evenly distributes the responsibility of RPs for
different times and locations. Therefore, having received
several tokens, a user is likely to poll every RP.
3) Compromising RPs: More sophisticated attackers may
also compromise one or more RPs. This corresponds to
obtaining knowledge of tokens τ being polled by users.
Anonymity: As described above, anonymity can only
be violated if location, co-location, or absence privacy is
violated as attackers only obtain IP addresses of the users.
Location privacy: Since the tokens τ that are stored
on the RP do not reveal any information about location or
time (this requires knowledge of the group key K exchanged
among users in the area), an attacker has to participate in
the service in order to violate this objective. That is, he has
to obtain M and the corresponding τ , as well as group key
K. In this case, he can infer the RP being polled by users
having resided at that location at this time. If he is able
to compromise this RP, he can violate the location privacy
of users having resided at the time and place contained in
M . Still, this is again not likely to be sufficient to infer the
identity of users. In order to track the movement of users,
an attacker has to know several tokens τ received by a user
which is only possible if he has been able to follow the user
in the disaster area over some time. Moreover, he has to be
able to compromise several RPs to follow the movement.
Co-location privacy: An attacker may violate this ob-
jective as he can detect whether two users poll the same RP
using the same τ . Nevertheless, this only provides knowl-
edge of a potential social connection between two unknown
users which may not be of much benefit. Assuming that an
attacker wants to find out if two known users (given their
IP addresses) have met, he has to be able to compromise
a specific RP responsible for the assumed place and time
of the meeting. In order to avoid this potential attack, users
may want to use an anonymous proxy when polling RPs to
hide the actual IP addresses.
Absence privacy: By observing whether a user never
polls a certain τ on a RP, an attacker can violate the
absence privacy of a user. Nevertheless, this only provides
an advantage if the user is known and the attacker is able
to compromise a specific RP for the location. As discussed
above, users may prevent this by using an anonymous proxy.
V. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the performance of our VUE ap-
proach, we implemented it in OMNeT++ [9] using the
MiXiM framework [10]. An overview of the simulation
parameters is given in Table I. In our simulation, users
move on a field according to a given mobility model while
negotiating tokens within their k-hop neighborhood. For
replicability, we modeled events by circles with a given
radius and users reporting an event when entering its area.
As we were interested in the number of witnesses that can
be expected for a report when negotiating tokens over k
hops, we used three different mobility models: the well-
known Random Waypoint (RWP), as well as two group
mobility models: Reference Point Group Mobility (RPGM)
Table I
OVERVIEW OF SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Simulated time 120 min (mobility warm-up 60 min)
Field setup 5× 5 km2, 2000 nodes, 100 events
Event radius U (25 m, 250 m)
Token negotiation interval U (15 min, 30 min)
Negotiation hop limit 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Token validity period 5 min (starting at time of reception)
Ratio of malicious nodes 0 .. 0.4 in steps of 0.05
Mobility Models RWP, RPGM, NC
Movement speed U (0.5 m/s, 1.5 m/s)
Group size (RPGM, NC) N (µ = 4, σ2 = 4)
Max. pause duration 60 s (RWP, RPGM), 15 min (NC)
Max. group / roaming radius 5 m (RPGM), 25 m (NC)
Radio Model IEEE 802.11 (2.4 GHz, 54 Mbit/s)
Transmit power 17 dBm (max. range ≈ 100 m)
Path loss model log-distance, log-normal shadowing
Path loss coefficients n = 3.0, σ = 9.5 dB
Fast fading model Jakes’ Rayleigh fading
and Nomadic Community (NC) [11]. We chose these mod-
els over existing mobility models for disasters since these
models either do not consider the mobility of the affected
population in a disaster or model it by applying existing
models for group movement [12]. Furthermore, in order to
get an impression of the abilities of our approach in terms of
detecting malicious users, we randomly set a certain fraction
to be malicious. At the end of the simulation, we collected
the sets of witnesses for the reported events and calculated
the ratio of benign majorities by counting the number of
reports with more benign users and dividing it by the total
number of reports. We used this ratio as it corresponds to the
correct confirmation of either true, or the rejection of false
reports. For witnesses, we assumed that malicious users are
always able to vote for a malicious and against a benign
report. In contrast, benign witnesses only confirm a true or
reject a false report, if they were actually in the event area.
Otherwise, they issue a vote with an unsure decision.
As expected, for an increasing number of k hops, we can
see that the number of witnesses increases as well (Fig. 3a).
Here, we can also see the impact of the different mobility
models. While for RWP, were users just move randomly,
the average number of witnesses is rather small with about
2 and only increases slightly, both group mobility models
show a larger number of witnesses (between 4.2 and 5.5
for NC and between 8 and 11 for RPGM) and a stronger
increase with increasing k. This behavior can be explained
with the group mobility models providing a larger number of
witnesses through the movement in groups which provides
a higher number of nodes that are in communication range.
Accordingly, we can see that the NC model, where users
move up to 25 m away from the center of the group, the
number of witnesses is smaller compared to the RPGM
model where users move closely to each other with only
about 5 m from the center of the group. Since group mobility
is more likely to appear after a disaster, we can see that our
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Figure 3. Simulation results (average of 100 repetitions with 99% confidence intervals)
approach benefits from this with more witnesses per event.
Furthermore, according to our expectations, the ratio
of unsure witnesses increases with the number of hops
(Fig. 3b). An interesting aspect here is the fact that for
the group mobility models, at 1 hop, the ratio of unsure
witnesses is smaller than for RWP. For more than 1 hop, the
group mobility models suffer from the fact that users move
in groups. Here, it is more likely that witnesses using the
same token have not been to the event area and are therefore
unsure. Hence, negotiating group keys over multiple hops
does not seem to be a good strategy for disasters where
users are likely to move in groups.
Finally, regarding the ratio of benign majorities for k = 1
(Fig. 3c), we can see that the group mobility models are able
to provide a higher ratio of benign majorities. This behavior
can be explained with the higher number of witnesses per
report. Nevertheless, for all mobility models, the approach
suffers from benign users being unsure about an event.
Therefore, we can see that, e.g., for 10% of malicious users,
less than 90% of all reports have a benign majority.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we proposed the concept of witness-based
report verification. We provided an extensive overview of
objectives to be fulfilled by such a scheme and presented
a first approach. Our evaluation shows the benefit of group
mobility, which results in a reasonable number of witnesses
per event while relying on single-hop negotiation of tokens.
In our future work, we plan to investigate the impact of
node densities and realistic reporting behavior that includes
the aspect of witnesses voting at different times. Finally, we
aim to consider incorporating reputation schemes to filter
malicious users and provide a comparison with existing ver-
ification schemes that are based on data mining techniques.
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